Way to Go Amy!

The photo at the left was taken at the ISI sponsored "The Culture of Enterprise" international student essay contest award ceremony held recently in Philadelphia. The only girl in the picture is none other than Tyndale's own Amy Gabriel (aka "conservative cowgirl"). She captured second place and a $5000 (USD) prize. Her essay, which you can read online here is entitled "Globalization: Two Alternative Visions" and was developed out of work she did for my course, INDS 4753 Christianity and Culture at Tyndale last Fall. The paper deals extensively with The Brothers Karazamov, which we studied in the course, and is a very well-crafted and interesting paper. In the picture are Dr. John Templeton of the Templeton Foundation on the left and Dr. Cribb, president of ISI, on the right. The other four students are the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th place winners. Amy is finishing up at Tyndale this year, so graduate schools who are on the look out for excellent students might want to take note. Congratulations Amy!

Do We Need More Dialogue on Homosexuality?

A few days ago, in my post "What Has Rowan Williams Done?" I questioned the wisdom of endless "dialogue" over the homosexuality issue and ended by criticizing the position that a Church can include within it both those holding traditional Christiain sexual morality and also the modern revisionists who advocate the normalization of homosexuality. Because of the lack of clarity in what the Covenant process actually means for those in the "second tier" or "track" I closed with this paragraph:

If he literally means what he says here, then he is basically advocating the liberal position. The liberals want "diversity" during the interim period between when their revisionism is first accepted and the point where they acquire hegemony and can impose their agenda on everyone. It is difficult to conceive of a Covenant structure where any meaningful discipline has been imposed on TEC if all that is implied by signing or not signing the Covenant is "two styles of being Anglican."

A reader (David) commented as follows:

I recently read William's book on Dostoevsky, and it would probably be helpful to know that for him the inability to continue being open to dialogue is a mark of evil. He writes [p. 113]: 'if the Devil's aim is silence, God's is speech, the dialogic speech by which we shape each other.'

That doesn't excuse him, but it might go some way to explaining that what looks like an extremely high view of unity is in actual fact an even higher view of keeping dialogue permanently open, whatever the risk. [p. 132] ‘If we speak what we believe to be the truth - especially truth about ourselves - we must not be surprised if it is misheard or consciously distorted.

To enter into conversation is always to be in this sense at risk.’ Of course, you're right that doctrinal integrity is more important than unity though. I don't envy him at all!

David raises some interesting issues with regard to unity, dialogue and truth. On p. 113, Williams is discussing a Bakhtinian reading of Dostoevesky's understanding of truth. The sentence quoted represents Bakhtin's understanding of how D. views the role language in helping us attain truth. There are two ways of understanding and appropriating Bakhtin's theories.

1. On the one hand, we can take the approach of the legion of literary critics who, intoxicated by the postmodern relativism that we imbibe with the water these days, understand Bakhtin's observations of the polyphonic rather than monologic nature of Dostoevesky's novels as the denial of any authoritative authorial voice and even the legitimate possibility of such a voice. This is why Williams says: "So for D. in Bakhtin's reading, narrative is argument and argument is narrative." (113) Williams notes that Bakhtin labels as an "ideological approach" any suggestion that "separate thoughts, assertions, propositions that can by themselves be true or untrue, depending on their relationship to the subject and independent of the carrier to whom they belong." (112) Now, there is a trivial sense in which no proposition can be interpreted accurately in idolation; it is always the case that a proposition has to be understood in context. This is the first thing seminary students are taught about exegesis. But the question is whether Bakhtin is going further here and saying that truth cannot be expressed in propositions at all. (If so, that is a proposition and hence presumeably untrue or at least in need of qualification and modification through dialogue). The more pertinent issue, however, is whether Williams agrees with this view.

2. On the other hand, Kroeker and Ward, in Remembering the End: Dostoevesky as Prophet to Modernity, agree with Bakhtin that D's novels are polyphonic (many voices speak from their own perspectives) but they argue that "this does not preclude the orchestrating presence of the author." (150) For Kroeker and Ward, we should not look for D's view in the perspective of Ivan or the Elder Zosima or even in Alyosha, whom D. calls the "hero" of the novel. Rather, we should look for D's view in the way the whole of the book is arranged and in the interactions of the characters, not in the static view of one character at one temporal point. This, of course, makes the process of literary criticism extremely complex, but it does not necessarily imply (though it could and only study of the novel could determine this) that truth is non-existent, unknown or relative for D. It may be possible (and Kroeker and Ward think it is) to come to some conclusions about D's own perspective on the issues of God, faith and goodness. They write: "It is legitimate, then, not only to speak of the author's concern with the possible 'turning around' of his character, but also to see that concern enacted in the novel itself." (150-1)

Canon, Creed and Truth
The interesting thing for me in Kroeker and Ward's approach to criticism is that they see the narrative of the novel as indispensible for D. in communicating his perspective, yet they also see their critical work in summarizing D's perspective, as they understand it, in propositional rather than narrative form as legitimate. We have here a parallel, I think, to the relationship between the Gospels and the Nicene Creed. The Church has recognized the inspiration and authority of the Gospels (and the two-Testament Bible as a whole) and submitted herself to the sacred Scriptures as the vox Deus. However, the Creed has also been adopted as a brief summary in propositions of the true meaning of the Scriptures and is seen as also the work of the Spirit (although inspiration and authority cannot be claimed for the Creed since it purports only to be a true interpretation of Scripture and not sacred Scripture itself). Many complex points clamour for attention here. But I just want to focus on one.

The parallel between a true critical appropriation of the authorial intent in both D's novels and the Bible seems to me to be illumninating. The fact that the Church canonized four (rather than one) Gospels means that a polyphonic presentation of the life and teachings of Christ was seen as necessary for the Church. Then too, the narrative format, with many voices and characters interacting with one another, was seen as necessary to convey the fullness of the truth about Christ. On the other hand, in the face of heresies and distortions, the Creed with its propositional statements could be used to rule out certain distorting readings of Scripture. The Creed gets at the essence of the Scripture, but makes no pretense of expressing the fullness of Scripture. So Canon and Creed are both indispensible; Creed can never replace Scripture and Scripture cannot be read accurately in contradiction of the Creed.

So is Truth narrative or propositional? The answer would seem to be both. So is dialogue necessary to the discovery of truth? The answer would seem to be yes, but not totally open-ended and endless dialogue. The Canon was rightly closed after the death of the Apostles. Dialogue is necessary but not as an end in itself; dialogue itself is in service of the Truth and dialogue is not necessarily in conflict with truth stated in propositional form.

The Nature of Dialogue and the Issue of Homosexuality
Is dialogue an absolute? No. To paraphrase Ecclesiastes: "There is a time for dialogue, and there is a time to refuse dialogue." Dialogue which pushes beyond the canonical text to indefinitely extend the discussion into the future with no resolution in sight (or with a resolution in sight that contradicts the essence of the Scriptural narrative as defined in the Creed) is not legitimate.

Is dialogue ever legitimate? Of course, it is. It can help us refine our understanding, help overcome misunderstandings, clarify the meaning of words, illuminate context, and help to avoid overlooking key aspects of the text. This is true both in literary criticism and biblical interpretation.

The important thing is to know the limits of dialogue. It can clarify the truth, but it cannot create new truth. This is the key point to consider when deciding if further dialogue on the issue of homosexuality in the Anglican Communion (or any other church) is needed.

The Brothers Karamazov and Liberal Modernity

The Brothers Karamazov is (rightly, in my opinion) regarded by many as not only the culmination of Dostoevsky's artistic vision, but also as a genuine work of prophecy. Dostoevsky writes as a Christian to warn, predict, instruct and declare.

In the next few posts, I want to discuss the interpretation of the Grand Inquisitor's vision and how it contrasts to the vision articulated by the Elder Zosima in Book VI, which immediately following Book V, which contains the key chapters (4. Rebellion and 5. The Grand Inquisitor). Page references will be the the translation by Richard Pevear and Larissa Volkhonsky published by Farrar, Straus and Giroux (1990).

I will also refer frequently to the stunningly insightful book by P. Travis Kroeker and Bruce K. Ward entitled: Remembering the End: Dostoevsky as Prophet to Modernity (Westview, 2001).
Much of my understanding of Dostoevsky is indebted to their fine work, although I also find that my understanding of Augustine and Yoder also helps to appreciate Dostoevsky's art. I find it astonishing and highly significant that such a high degree of unity exists between the 4th century church father, the 19th century Russian Orthodox and the 20th century Mennonite. I leave the reader to figure out how they fit together; I merely point out the fact.


The Grand Inquisitor

The Grand Inquisitor has been interpreted, wrongly in my view, as representing Roman Catholicism as a whole over against Orthodoxy. He has also be misinterpreted as standing for the totalitarian movements of National Socialism and Soviet Communism that occured in the 20th century.


The Grand Inquisitor actually represents, not a pathological offshoot of modernity, but modernity itself. The GI represents, ironically, not only political religion (i.e. the church siezing control of the levers of political power and using coercion to enforce its views on an unwilling population), but the GI also represents religious politics (i.e. the State assuming God-like proportions and implementing a soft totalitarianism that not only takes away the freedom of people in the name of equality, but which does so in such a way that the people beg the State to relieve them of the burden of freedom). So Hitler and Stalin were only crude prototypes of the GI, who relied on external coercion to rule. The GI, by contrast, will rule by popular acclamation and will assume the burden of freedom for people so that they can rely on the GI (the State) to meet their material needs and allow them to sin.

To understand how this is so, we must listen to Ivan as he speaks throught the mouth of the GI. In Ivan's poem, the GI has arrested Jesus, who appeared unexpectedly in Seville in the late 16th century on the day after the GI has burnt 100 heretics in a grand auto de fe. The GI has arrested Jesus and is now speaking to him in Jesus' prison cell. Jesus remains silent throughout the poem. The GI says "The dread and intelligent spirit, the spirit of self-destruction and non-being . . . the great spirit spoke with you in the wilderness . . . Was it possible to say anything more true than what he proclaimed to you in his three questions? . . . For in these three questions all subsequent human history is as if brought together in a single whole and foretold." (BK, 252)

The Grand Inquisitor as a Hegelian

Kroeker and Ward point out that the 3 temptations correspond to the 3 stages of world history in Hegel's philosophy of history. The first stage is the temptation to rule the masses by giving them bread and corresponds to what Hegel called the Oriental World. In every civilization prior to Christianity there was a unity of the religous and the political power (along with the economic and judicial and other powers) in the person of the Emperor, who personifies the empire.

The second stage is introduced by Christianity and is the development of individual freedom. The individual comes to understand himself as distinct from the hive, the totality - as more than merely a cog in the State machinery. Jesus is tempted to throw himself down from the Temple, thus calling attention to his unique status as God's son and the miracle which God would do to save him. The GI admits that Jesus reacted magnificently in refusing to tempt God, but asks how many of the common herd could do the same? Here he doubts the feasiblility of freedom for common human beings.

The third stage is the reconciliation of equality (the unified State) and freedom (individual consciousness). Here Jesus is tempted to worship the Devil and refuses. The GI proudly asserts that he and his colleagues have corrected Jesus' mistake at this point: "we are not with you, but with him, that is our secret!" (BK, 257)

Liberal Democracy as the End of History?

Modern liberal democracy claims to be the reconciliation of equality (Rousseau, Marx) and freedom (Hobbes, Locke, Jefferson) in a synthesis that works (American Pragmatism). Francis Fukuyama, a contemporary populizer of Hegel, claims that liberal democracy has triumphed over its foes and so we now stand at the "end of history. But Fukuyama does not admit that contemporary liberal democracy actually is a synthesis of the Marxist impulse toward equality and the Capitalist faith in the wealth-creating Market. "Pure" 19th century Capitalism no longer exists. Since the "New Deal" Capitalism and the Welfare State have been fused together. The Market God and the State God are both worshipped equally for one creates the wealth and the other redistributes it in such a way as to leave incentive for wealth creation without allowing such exptremes of wealth and poverty so as to incite revolution. Liberal modernity has triumphed over Communism precisely by absorbing much of the Marxist emphasis on equality into itself without ceasing to be itself. The Capitalist Welfare State has triumphed, but not because Capitalism has obliterated Marxism, but rather because it has co-opted it. The two party system in liberal Western states (liberal socialist and neo-conservative) is necessary to maintain the delicate balance. Those who call for less government (neo-conservatives) and those who call for more government (liberal) are just emphasizing two sides of the same integrated system.

Dostoevsky's prophecy is of a state in which the many would gladly surrender their freedom to their rulers in exchange for 1) material well-being and 2) sexual freedom. The GI says: "in the end they will lay their freedom at our feet and say to us 'Better that you enslave us, but feed us.' They will finally understand that freedom and earthly bread in plenty for everyone are inconceivable together, for never, never will they be able to share among themselves." (BK, 253) In other words, the equality of the first stage of history (the equlity of the hive) will characterize this State. But the GI also says: "We will tell them that every sin wil be redeemed if it is committed with our permission; and that we allow them to sin because we love them." (BK, 259) This tyranny is much more sophisticated than that of Hitler and Stalin because they had to rule by external coercion. People felt dominated and abused by them; this new tyranny will not feel that way. Instead, it will appeal to a real aspect of human nature: the sensuous desire for physical gratification common to all fallen humans. This is what makes it dangerous. Although Dostoevsky does not say it explicitly, we see his vision fulfilled in the sexual revolution. The State changes the law (allows us to sin) because it loves us. So infatuated with this "freedom" we gladly exchange our political freedom for it.

Dostoevsky is drawing a picture of a soft totalitariainism along the lines of Aldous Huxley's Brave New World, in which promiscuity and drugs are what keeps the population quiet, while the State has taken over the business of human reproduction. The only ones who are unhappy in the GI's vision of the end of history are the rulers because they must govern on the basis of a lie. What is this lie?

The Grand Inquisitor: A Liar Like His Hero the Devil:

The lie is that freedom and equality have been reconciled and Hegel's synthesis has been achieved, that is, that the end of history is here. In actual fact it is more like a reversion to the pre-Christian Oriental World in which there is plenty of equality but no real freedom. The freedom of the subjects of liberal modernity is 'freedom to gratify one's physical desires here and now" but it pales beside the grandeur of the Augustinian definition of freedom as 'freedom to act toward the good for human nature,' which is true freedom. The freedom of liberal modernity is, from a Christian perspective, slavery to the lusts of the flesh and thus no freedom at all.

Yet, even if this version of history sounds less bad to you than other possibilities (eg. nuclear war that destroys civilization), you need to know that even this version is not feasible, as we shall see in the next post.

Tomorrow's Post: "The Nietzschean Correction of Hegel"
Third Post: "The Alternative Vision of the Elder Zosima"
Concluding Post: "Conservatism as the Rejection of Liberal Modernity"